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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
wear and decay and damages by the elements only excepted.)" The defendant
immediately took possession and began remodeling the interior and exterior of
the building. It did not appear from the record whether the alterations were
beneficial or prejudicial "to the inheritance." The bill was for an injunction
to prevent further alterations and the defendant appealed from a temporary
restraining order. Held, that it was waste even if the alterations were a bene-
fit, and the restraining order was affirmed. Stephenson v. National Bank of
Winterhaven, et al, (Fla., 1926), 109 So., 424.
The rule of the common law, and in a majority of the jurisdictions in the
United States, is that any material alterations of the buildings on leased
premises by a tenant for years, without the consent of the landlord, is waste
regardless of whether the alterations are beneficial to the owner of the rever-
sion. London v. Greyme, (1607) Cro. Jac., 181, 79 Eng. Reprint, 158; United
States v. Bostwick, (1876) 94 U. S., 53, 24 L. Ed., 65; Maddox v. White, (1853)
4 Md., 72, 59 Am. Dec., 67; Woolworth Co. v. Nelson, (1920) 204 Ala., 172, 85
So., 449, 13 A. L. R., 820. The reasons assigned for this rule are: (1) that the
evidence of title is affected by diminution of the means of identifying the
premises, Cole v. Green, (1672) 1 Lev., 309, 83 Eng. Reprint, 422; Brock v. Dole,
(1886) 66 Wis., 142, 28 N. W., 334; and (2) that by a lease the lessee is given
only a right of user in the building and the landlord is entitled to receive back,
at the end of the term, the very thing which he has leased, Agate v. Lowenbein,
(1874) 57 N. Y., 604; Hamburger and Dreyling v. Settegast, (1910) 62 Tex.
Civ. App., 446, 131 S. W., 639. The former reason seems to have been properly
discredited in view of the fact that in modern conveyancing property is de-
scribed by metes and bounds, or courses and distances, or with reference to a
plat or survey. Pynchon v. Stearns, (1846) 11 Metc., 304, 45 Am. Dec., 207; see
also the opinion of Lord Blackburn in Doherty v. Allman, (1878) 3 App. Cas.,
709. Though the doctrine of the principal case is in support of a rule of long
standing the modern trend of authorities seems to require that, in order to
entitle the landlord to injunctive relief or compensation for waste, it must be
shown that the alterations were of a prejudicial nature or that it will be im-
possible to restore the premises at the end of the term substantially as the
tenant received them. In Fred v. Moseley, (1912) (Tex. Civ. App.), 146 S. W.,
343, a case very similar on its facts to the principal case, the court refused to
issue an injunction against a tenant for years who contemplated changing the
leased store building into a moving picture theater. Doherty v. Allman, (1878)
3 App. Cas., 709 was a case in which the House of Lords and the Privy Coun-
cil refused to grant an injunction to restrain a tenant for years from converting
store buildings into dwelling houses, on the ground that the neighborhood had
changed so as to do away with any demand for store buildings. But in that
case the lease was for a period of 999 years and the length of the term was a
governing factor. T. S. '27.
MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION Acr*. Claimant news-
paper boy was struck and injuried by an automobile after he bad completed his
delivery route, and was riding his bicycle on his way home, but was still within
the bounds of his district. He was not unnecessarily loitering, nor was negli-
gence imputed to him, and the question is whether his status at the time of the
injury and the place of the accident were such that he might come within the
provisions of the act allowing compensation to employes for injuries "in courses
of employment." Held, that claimant was injured on his master's premises "in
course of employment," since he was within the area prescribed as his working
district; that injury was not inflicted outside district because he was riding on
opposite side of bounding street, in accordance with traffic laws. Makins v
Industrial Accident Commission, (Cal.) 247 Pac., 202.
This brings us to the consideration of what constitutes "in course of em-
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ployment," and what is the extent of the employer's liability under what is
termed the "going and coming rule." While many jurisdictions state the general
rule to be that injuries suffered by employes when going to or coming from
work are not compensable, they qualify this doctrine in many instances by add-
ing, "in absence of special circumstanes." Comstock v. Bivens, (Colo.) 239
Pac., 869. Some consider that in order to recover there must be a causal con-
nection between the employment and the injury. Larsan v. Industrial Accident
Commission, (Cal.) 224 Pac., 744, for instance, where a ranchman was injured
by an explosion in a bunkhouse after hours, and as the house was the only
place provided by the employer, there was deemed to be a causal connection
between employment and injury. Traynor v. City of Buffalo, 203 N. Y. S., 590,
holds according to the general rule that injuries inflicted while going and
coming are not within the scope of employment, and hence not compensable.
The California court, too, lays down as the general rule the same doctrine, in
California Casualty Indemnity Exchange v. Ind. Acc. Com., 190 Cal., 433, 213
Pac. 257, where a truck driver was injured coming from lunch, and held not "in
course of employment"; and London Guaranty and Accident Co. v. Ind. Acc.
Com., 190 Cal., 587, 213 Pac. 977, where an employe was not allowed to re-
cover for an injury which occurred while he was doing extra work at home
after his evening meal. The theory in many of these cases is that the employe
is not indemnified against a risk to which the general public is exposed.
As it has been suggested above, there are many exceptions to the general
rule. The employee is generally protected when he is going, coming, or is on
the premises of his employer. Starr Piano Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com., 181 Cal.,
433, 184 Pac., 860. Especially is this true when the employee is not unduly
loitering. Wabash R. Co. v. Ind. Com., 294 Ill., 119, 128 N. E., 290, where it
was the custom of a roundhouse switchman to leave by a certain way; and
Lienau v. Northwestern Telephone Exchange Co., 151 Minn., 258, 186 N. W.,
945, where an employe recovered from an injury sustained while leaving the
premises on an elevator.
But a large number of courts, however, go still farther, and say that it is not
necessary for the employee to be on the premises in order for him to recover.
A few of these are, Lake v. City of Bridgeport, 102 Conn., 337, 128 A., 782,
where a special policeman was injuried by an automobile on his way to report
at headquarters, and was held to be "in course of employment"; Bendry v.
Watkins et al (Mich.) 158 N. W. 16, where a boy who was riding home on his
bicycle for lunch and caught on to a truck was injured, and held to be within
scope of employment; Stratton v. Interstate Fruit Co., (S. D.) 199 N. W., 117,
where a truck driver went out of his usual route on his way home to lunch, had
an accident, and was allowed to recover on the same principle. See also, State
ex rel McCarthy Bros. v. District Court of Hennepin County, (Minn.) 169
N. W., 274, where a salesman who was returning home from his sales territory
on Sunday was drowned, and was allowed to recover. As a flood prevented
the deceased from using the train, he came by skiff, and the court held that since
he used his home as headquarters, he naturally desired to get home on the
Sabbath, so any means he might employ were reasonable, and hence he came
within the provisions of the act.
Thus it seems that while the general rule is laid down with great stress in
most cases, the courts are very liberal in applying the exceptions. There is ap-
parently no working rule to decide just when the employe was acting within
the scope of his employment. As was pointed out in the Makins case, supra,
the only way to decide is to consider carefully the facts of each particular case.
C. H. L. '28.
*This comment and the following one seem to cover the same subject, but as
the comments were written by different students, and as the treatment is differ-
ent, we feel justified in printing both comments.
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